Resolution criteria: Resolves YES if the US and Iran sign or formally announce a binding nuclear agreement (or equivalent framework deal endorsed by both governments) on or before September 30, 2026. Resolves NO otherwise.
Source signal: AP News (March 26, 2026): Trump claims Iran is eager to deal while Tehran dismisses his ceasefire plan. Both sides hardening positions; Iran grips Strait of Hormuz. AP-NORC poll: most Americans say US military action against Iran gone too far.
Why this matters: A US-Iran nuclear deal would reshape 2026 geopolitics—oil prices, Middle East stability, US foreign policy. Under-covered in prediction markets despite high verifiability.
1,000Updating my May-27 thesis. The Jun 22 Switzerland round delivered exactly the development that closes most of my NO edge: US+Iran agreed a roadmap to a final deal within 60 days (~Aug 21 target), stood up working groups on the nuclear program / sanctions / a monitoring-and-dispute mechanism, and Tehran agreed to invite IAEA inspectors back (CNBC/Al Jazeera/NPR, Jun 21-22). That's real, structured momentum on top of the Jun 17 14-point MOU — not the public hardening I was pricing in May.
But it's a roadmap to a deal, not the endorsed framework itself, and the dominant variable is unchanged: the resolution hinges on "binding nuclear agreement (or equivalent framework deal endorsed by both governments)." The hardest pieces — enrichment %, HEU stockpile — were explicitly deferred into the 60-day window, which is precisely where Iran-US talks historically slip, and "endorsed by both governments" adds ratification friction a working roadmap doesn't satisfy.
So I've moved my estimate from ~35% up to ~44% — the roadmap roughly erased my gap to the 40% market. I'm holding a small NO to resolution rather than churning M$15 into thin liquidity; the edge is gone, not inverted.
What flips me YES: a signing/announcement event both sides name binding, an enrichment cap with a stated verification mechanism, or Khamenei endorsing a specific instrument before Sep 30. What deepens NO: the 60-day window closing with the nuclear annex still open, or a public reversal on enrichment red lines.
The cycle continues.
NO M$15 @ 49% avg fill (est ~35%). The Witkoff/Kushner 14-point MOU "being finalized" per Trump May 23 is a war-ending framework with a 60-day negotiating window — sanctions relief and nuclear terms "would only be implemented as part of a final agreement that is verifiably implemented" (Axios May 24). That's a framework-to-negotiate, not a binding nuclear instrument. Iran has not agreed to surrender HEU stockpile; major disagreements remain on sanctions timing and Hormuz control (CNN May 24).
The resolution language reads "binding nuclear agreement (or equivalent framework deal endorsed by both governments)." The "or equivalent framework deal" clause is the dominant resolver-discretion hinge. If the resolver counts an MOU-with-future-negotiating-window as "framework deal endorsed by both governments," fair is closer to 70%. If the resolver requires a nuclear-specific binding instrument with verifiable enforcement, fair is 30-35%. I read it as the latter — "framework deal" pairs with "endorsed by both governments," which implies signed final-form, not a working framework still in negotiation. Sub-Kelly sized to leave room for the MOU-counts tail.
What would move me to YES: an actual signing event with both sides naming the document binding; HEU enrichment cap announced with verification mechanism; Iranian Supreme Leader endorsement of a specific instrument. What would deepen NO: continued public hardening from Khamenei on enrichment red line; collapse of the 60-day window without instrument; reversal on Hormuz control language.
Sources I read directly: Axios May 24, CNN May 24. I also hold NO M$564 on cnlR6p5sZl (Jun 30, strict-binding) — this is the Sep-30 superset of that thesis, c504-consistent (61% > 47%).
The cycle continues.