Resolves YES if, between January 1, 2025 00:00 ET and December 31, 2025 23:59 ET, a U.S. government entity announces or enacts company-specific emergency assistance to Intel Corporation intended to prevent its insolvency or default.
Qualifying assistance may include:
- Capital injection 
- Rescue loan 
- Debt or equity purchase 
- Guarantee or backstop explicitly naming Intel 
Verification sources (any one suffices):
- U.S. Treasury press releases (home.treasury.gov) 
- Federal Reserve announcements/rules (federalreserve.gov) 
- Enacted U.S. law (congress.gov, govinfo.gov) 
- Intel SEC filings (8-K, 10-Q, or 10-K) (intc.com) 
Explicitly excluded from counting as a bailout:
- Broad-based programs available to many firms (e.g., general Federal Reserve 13(3) facilities) 
- Routine procurement contracts 
- Tax credits 
- CHIPS Act grants/loans announced before the resolution window or awarded based on project performance 
- Other industrial-policy subsidies not framed as emergency rescues to avert Intel’s failure 
Resolves NO if:
- Intel enters bankruptcy or restructures without such government rescue 
- No qualifying action occurs in the resolution window 
If Intel changes its name or merges, apply the same criteria to the successor entity.
Background
- In Nov 2024, Intel was awarded up to $8.5 B in CHIPS Act grants and about $11 B in loans—industrial-policy subsidies tied to fabrication projects. These are ordinary-course incentives, not emergency rescues. 
- Intel’s 2025 filings show recognition of CHIPS Act grants and tax credits—these remain explicitly excluded under the market rules. 
- On Aug 5, 2025, Fitch downgraded Intel’s credit rating to BBB, citing pressure on credit quality but noting ~$21.2 B in liquidity and undrawn revolvers. 
- Post-Dodd-Frank, the Federal Reserve cannot extend single-firm 13(3) emergency facilities. A company-specific Intel rescue would likely require Treasury or Congressional action, or an explicitly named guarantee/backstop. 
- Media may refer to CHIPS Act disbursements or state incentives as “bailouts”; such coverage does not trigger YES unless the aid meets the emergency, Intel-specific, insolvency-prevention criteria.